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 A New Legal Avenue for Pricing GHG Emissions? To Trade or to Tax? 
ABSTRACT 
In a recent media release the Prime Minister of Australia presented the terms of reference for the 
newly established Multi Party Climate Change Committee. Although the Committee is charged with 
considering climate change mitigation measures in general, specifically the Committee must consider 
an appropriate mechanism for the establishment of a carbon price. The purpose of this paper is to 
provide an overview of the mechanisms to be considered by the Climate Change Committee, including 
the use of emissions trading and carbon levies in other jurisdictions. This paper argues that for any 
effective investigation of a carbon price for Australia to occur, a thorough knowledge of other 
jurisdictions’ methods for carbon pricing is essential.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
On 27
th
 September 2010 the Prime Minister announced the establishment of a Multi Party Climate 
Change Committee. The committee was established on the basis that: 
a carbon price is an economic reform that is required to reduce carbon pollution, to encourage 
investment in low emissions technologies and complement other measures including renewable energy 
and energy efficiency.
1
  
The Committee is to consider different mechanisms for pricing carbon dioxide emissions, including a 
broad based emissions trading scheme, a broad based carbon levy, and a hybrid model of both these 
instruments. The consideration of these mechanisms will include the coverage, international linking, 
implementation and assistance for both households and businesses. This analysis must include a study 
of the advantages and disadvantages of emissions trading and those of a potential carbon levy. In 
addition, given that both the linking and implementation form criteria for the terms of reference of this 
committee, consideration must extend to emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes from other 
domestic jurisdictions. Finally the committee must consider the existing framework in Australia that 
may impact on any carbon tax legal framework.  
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of some of the key issues that must be considered 
by the Climate Change Committee when a carbon price for Australia is examined.  In presenting this 
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overview schemes and taxes implemented in other jurisdictions will be canvassed. These jurisdictions 
can provide valuable lessons for policy makers when evaluating the issues for an Australian carbon 
price.  These other domestic schemes must also inform this committee when consideration is given to 
both linking and implementation issues. Indeed, some of these domestic legal frameworks already 
have implications for Australian industries.
2
 The final part of this paper will review the existing legal 
framework in Australia that may have implications for a carbon price. This will form an important 
part of the analysis of the Climate Change Committee, given that any economic reform can potentially 
have widespread implications.   
2. WHY PRICE GHG EMISSIONS? 
Climate science dictates a need to reduce GHG emissions and limit the concentration in the 
atmosphere in order to avoid an increase in global temperatures.
3
 These scientific claims lead to a 
moral obligation to avoid GHG emissions on a domestic level. The international climate change 
regime effectively transforms this moral obligation into a legally binding duty to take action to limit 
emissions.  
2.1 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the UNFCCC)4 
The UNFCCC, adopted at the Rio Conference in 1992, formally acknowledges the need to reduce 
GHG emissions for the purpose of climate change mitigation.
5
 The UNFCCC was drafted in response 
to scientific claims that the earth was warming as a result of human activity.  Although doubt 
surrounded the scientific evidence in 1992, the precautionary principle
6
 required remedial action.  
The overriding objective of the international climate change regime is contained in Article 2 of the 
UNFCCC. This objective requires parties to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system by stabilizing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere.  
The principles of the UNFCCC are embedded in Article 3 of the convention. The obligations include 
the promotion of sustainable development. Sustainable development was officially defined 
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internationally in the Brundtland Report
7
 in 1987 to mean ‗development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
8
 This report 
provided strategies to be used when introducing policies in accordance with the goal of sustainable 
development. The most relevant to this research program is the requirement to make more effective 
use of economic instruments, with a goal to internalising environmental costs.
9
  
The commitments to the UNFCCC,
10
 are contained in Article 4 of the Convention.  These 
commitments include promotion of sustainable management and a recognised need for sustainable 
economic growth. There is also a clear obligation for developed country parties to ‗adopt national 
policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases‘.11 
The UNFCCC does not stress a need to price GHG emissions, beyond references to sustainable 
development. However, through the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, a price was indeed 
allocated to emissions for signatory parties. This was done by introducing limits, providing a means 
for trading these limits, and by imposing penalties on any parties failing to meet allocated targets.   
2.2 The Kyoto Protocol (Kyoto)
12
 
The Kyoto Protocol changed the shape of the international climate change regime from a single 
instrument containing broad and general obligations to a regime with strict targets, and penalties for 
non compliance. An unnamed price was attached to GHG emissions, for Annex I parties, through 
targets represented by unit allocation. The Protocol does not provide guidance for how nation states 
can meet these targets, but does include ‗flexible mechanisms‘ as a means for parties to gain, trade 
and sell units when it is required. Included in these mechanisms is the concept of International 
Emissions Trading (IET),
13
 which enables nation states to buy and sell units to meet the Protocol‘s 
obligations. 
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The IET mechanism under Kyoto creates what is effectively a nation based trading market. 
Companies and individuals who release GHG gases are not recognised by the Protocol. Although the 
possibility of governments devolving their obligations to entities in their territory and allowing these 
entities to trade allowances internationally is recognized by the treaty,
 14
 the development of a carbon 
price domestically is independent of the international climate change regime. The result of a price on 
GHG emissions domestically is that entities and individuals responsible for emissions are 
economically accountable for pollution. It is this same pollution that the units allocated through the 
Kyoto Protocol attach to.  
2.3 Enforcement of the Regime 
The compliance system of the International Climate Change Regime has been heralded as the most 
advanced in international environmental law.
15
  
Tightly defined consequences follow any unattained targets of the Kyoto Protocol.
16
 Firstly, a 
mandatory unit deduction of 30 percent from subsequent commitment periods is taken from the state. 
The provision of a detailed compliance plan is also required of the noncompliant state. These 
penalties will increase the economic burden on nation states, and taxpayers of those states that do not 
meet their targets. Therefore, failure to take action may result in an economic burden on national 
governments through either a requirement to buy additional units, or through payment of a penalty.  
The analysis of the International Climate Change regime presents a compelling argument for pricing 
carbon domestically. The obligations of the regime are legally binding, and targets must be reached, 
or penalties paid. The argument to price GHG emissions also has foundations in economic theory. 
Specifically the theory of externalities and demand theory.    
2.4 The Theory of Externalities 
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
17
 
The tragedy of the commons describes situations where valuable resources are squandered because 
users are not charged for them. When a valuable resource has a price of zero, people will continue to 
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exploit it as long as its marginal benefit remains positive. The polluter pays principle is an economic 
rule of cost allocation. The source of the principle is in the theory of externalities.
18
 
An externality can be described as a cost or an impact to a third party to a transaction, which they, as 
the third party, have no control over. In the case of manufacturing, externalities are costs of producing 
a product that is not reflected in the final cost of that product,
19
 it is a cost, however, which is borne 
elsewhere.  A negative externality can be described as a cost to the external environment. For climate 
change the negative externality is the release of anthropogenic greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, 
thus causing the atmospheric concentration to increase, and ultimately, the climate to change. To 
enable the price of a good to properly reflect the costs associated with its production, a price must be 
allocated to these emissions.   
Pigou was first to suggest a tax mechanism to internalise externalities in 1920.
20
 The tax structure 
conceptualised by Pigou required that externalities were wholly internalised in the cost of a product, 
thus environmental damage reduced and damage limited. Pigouvian taxes can be considered 
corrective taxes, as they correct the bias of using an apparently free resource and cause the price of a 
product to be closer to the social cost of production.
21
  
The ensuing discussion reviews the economic arguments and considerations for pricing externalities.  
2.5 The Economic Theory of Demand  
A market for any good consists of all the buyers and sellers of that good.  People buy at particular 
prices and sell at others. The price of a good is dependent on a number of things, including the value 
to the buyer, the cost of production and the amount a person is willing to pay for the good.  One of the 
fundamental theories of economics is the theory of demand. The basis of this theory is that, in a given 
market, there is an inverse relationship between demand and price.  
There are a number of reasons for the behaviour reflected in the demand curve, most to do with 
individual reactions to price. One such explanation is the substitution effect.
22
 As the price of a 
commodity increases consumers may have an increased desire to change commodities and substitute 
one for another. When discussing climate change the relevant commodity would be the cause of the 
GHG emissions, and the price increase would be a result of any charge implemented for the emissions 
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associated with the product, therefore increasing the cost of the product.  Any substitution would 
either need to be for a product with less GHG emission outputs as a result of production, through 
either energy changes or otherwise, or for a reduced GHG emissions intensive product itself, such as 
natural gas in place of petrol. The economic benefits of doing this, would of course, be related to the 
nature of the mechanism used to price the GHG emissions.  
 A decreasing quantity demand may also be explained through reduced purchasing power of the 
individual. This is called the income effect of a price change. There is simply less capacity for an 
individual to purchase as much as they previously did prior to the price increase and therefore the 
demand decreases. 
23
 
Finally the willingness of the buyer plays a significant role in the quantity demanded of a particular 
product. The cost benefit principle of economics suggests that buyers will only purchase a product if 
the expected benefit exceeds the cost. As the price increases so too does the cost to the buyer, and the 
number of buyers who perceive the cost as less than the benefit decreases.
24
 
In simple terms as the price of a product goes up through taxation, the demand will decrease.
25
 
However, the capacity of a tax to change behaviour is determined by a number of factors such as the 
elasticity of demand, the availability of substitutes and the profits or economic efficiency of particular 
firms.
26
 Therefore, although the result of any price associated with GHG emissions will ultimately 
lead to a decrease in those emissions, there is some difficulty in reducing the amount of GHG 
emissions enough to have an impact on climate change, without substantially disturbing the economic 
environment. 
This means that where a tax is positioned in the economy, or in the case of emissions trading, who is 
obliged to buy permits, is of vital importance to potential environmental success of the economic 
mechanism. It is through the implementation and methodology of the tax base, or ETS structure, that 
the internalisation of GHG emissions can be assured. In addition to ensuring that the right products, 
goods or processes are subject to the mechanism, identifying the causes of GHG emissions, and 
imposing liability as broadly as possible, without crippling the system administratively, will increase 
the chances of positive changes occurring across the economy.  Furthermore, any successful 
mitigation strategy will have to have an effect on the potential availability of substitutes. This will 
mean encouragement of technological innovation will be necessary.  
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The economic arguments are important when considering any new economic instrument for the 
purpose of mitigating climate change. These theories may assist in the determination of the necessary 
liable parties, and the most effective points of obligation for an instrument to achieve the maximum 
reductions in GHG emissions, whilst maintaining the domestic economic status quo.  
If it is accepted that a price must be allocated to GHG emissions as a negative externality of modern 
society, the question then begs, which economic instrument is the most effective mechanism for 
allocating this price?  
3. EMISSIONS TRADING AND CARBON TAXES 
Climate change presents a unique challenge... it is the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen. 
27
 
The virtues of the market were first advocated by Adam Smith, claiming that individual self interest 
would lead to an efficient economy.
28
 It was his claim that a market left unregulated would lead to 
general well being as if guided by an invisible hand.
29
 The failure of the free market, resulting in 
inefficiencies in resource allocation,
30
 can occur for a number of reasons. One of these includes the 
existence of externalities. The terms of reference of the climate change committee require that a price 
is allocated to GHG emissions through a market based mechanism using either an emissions trading 
scheme, a carbon levy or a hybrid model.   
Although it is generally accepted that an economic instrument is an important legislative tool for 
climate change, the question begs, which form of instrument is best? Unfortunately this presents a 
difficult question to answer, and hinges on the design of the mechanism itself. The Garnaut Review 
acknowledged the importance in designing a well functioning scheme in the 2008 report: 
Policy makers would be better off abandoning an emissions trading scheme in favour of a broad-based 
emissions tax without exemptions if they felt unable to resist pressures on the political process for 
ad hoc and overly generous assistance arrangements for…industries.31 
An emissions trading scheme (ETS) is a scheme developed for the purpose of trading in rights to emit 
greenhouse gas emissions.
32
 An ETS generally requires a target to be given to the source of 
greenhouse gases, with permits either issued or auctioned. Whether the source will buy emissions 
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permits rather than mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, logically, depends on the price of the permits 
on the emissions trading market.
 33
 The price of the permit can potentially fluctuate continually.  
A common argument in favour of an ETS over a carbon tax is based on the capacity of an ETS to 
place a cap on the number of emissions.
34
 Although appealing at first consideration, this argument is 
flawed, especially with the concessions, available credits and uncertainty associated with emissions 
trading in its infancy.  Furthermore, the ability to substitute emissions units from other jurisdictions, 
and indeed, even Kyoto units themselves, can cause loss of scheme credibility.
35
  
It has been suggested that a carbon tax would be too difficult to implement, based on the difficulties in 
setting the optimum rate of taxation.
36
  Although there are some merits in this argument, the same can 
be said of permit numbers under an emissions trading scheme. The difference, however, between 
changing the rate of taxation and reducing or increasing permit numbers is that permits have a defined 
legal identity.
37
 Although this may lead to legislative complications, including banking and borrowing 
requirements, it may prove more attractive to investors, which could be essential for the 
environmental effectiveness of the instrument.  
One obvious benefit of a carbon tax is its price stability.
 38
  It is this stability that allows governments 
and industries to both plan with a degree of economic precision. Where emissions trading fixes the 
quantity of emissions, taxation allows the quantity to fluctuate, but fixes the price. For governments 
this stability means that revenue can be predicted and allocated accordingly.
39
 Where a scheme is to 
be revenue neutral, this ability to predict levels is absolutely essential for balancing a fiscal budget. 
This allows efficient planning for whichever method of revenue recycling is used.
40
  
The argument of familiarity, which can make traditional command and control regulation so 
appealing, can also be applied to a carbon tax. The administrative structure of a tax is not a new 
concept to policy makers and legislators. Liable entities will be familiar with reporting obligations of 
other tax regimes, which will make implementation less problematic.  Furthermore legal rules, such as 
a nation‘s Constitution, that potentially impact new taxation laws, are well known to policy makers 
and drafters alike.  
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It is possible to make arguments that favour both forms of economic instrument. Regardless of which 
market mechanism is chosen, it will be essential to review historical implementation in other domestic 
jurisdictions, as well as the current existing regimes for the mitigation of GHG emissions.  
4. EMISSIONS TRADING 
Emissions trading is regarded as a flexible economic instrument, which has been described as 
providing the best means of achieving cost effective emission reduction.
41
  
The concept of trading in emissions began in the United States with the Sulphur Dioxide Reduction 
Plan.
42
 The purpose of this plan was to reverse the effects of acid deposition through an emission 
allocation and transfer program. This plan began with capping the emission units of sulphur dioxide 
from coal-fired power plants and expanded to incorporate more corporations and areas.
43
  It was a 
highly successful method of sulphur dioxide emission reduction.  
International Emissions Trading (IET) was introduced to the rest of the world as a means of achieving 
emission reduction targets as a flexible mechanism of the Kyoto protocol
44
. IET was included in 
Kyoto after successful negotiations by the United States in the early stages of discussions. The 
success of the acid rain program was presented as evidence of the potential of a market to cost 
effectively reduce emissions. 
45
  
There have been a number of academic articles published discussing the different scheme proposals 
and the differences between them and this article does not intend to replicate these in any detail.
46
 The 
following is a brief discussion of key features of emissions trading schemes in the European Union 
and New Zealand, and an overview of the Australian CPRS proposal.   
4.1 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
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The EU ETS was established by a Directive of the European Council.
47
 The scheme has since been 
amended by a number of subsequent directives.
48
 This scheme is designed to apply to all members of 
the European Union, and effectively redistributes allowances as allocated under the Kyoto Protocol.  
The EU ETS directive includes a prohibition on emissions by relevant installations, prohibiting 
emissions unless a permit has been issued by the competent authority.
49
 This inclusion effectively 
combines the use of economic incentives with the traditional command and control regulation permit 
system. The EU ETS permit sets out reporting and monitoring conditions and is to be reviewed by the 
authority every 5 years.
50
 In addition to holding a permit the installation is required to surrender a 
relevant number of allowances at the end of each year. 
51
 
The EU ETS covers approximately 45 per cent of European carbon dioxide emissions, this translates 
to 30 per cent of total EU ghg emissions.
52
 Initially only carbon dioxide was included in the ETS, 
however, the second phase of the scheme included nitrous oxide emissions.  The liable parties are 
stationary installations including combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel factories 
and factories making cement, glass, lime, brick, ceramics, pulp and paper. 
53
 
The EU ETS recognises credits from CDM and JI projects to comply with their emission reduction 
targets. The Directive
54
 issues some qualitative limits on which projects CDM and JI credits may be 
used from
55
. In addition there is a quantitative limit on the number of credit units that may be used. 
This is to enable adherence to the supplementarity principle of Kyoto.
56
 The quantitative requirement 
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Through the first and second phase the EU scheme has operated through National Allocation Plans 
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57
 and conditions. However, different national 
approaches among the member states has seen similar industries allocated different allocations and 
treated differently between jurisdictions.  The most recent directive concerning the EU ETS has 
amended this in paragraph 8,
58
 and NAPs will no longer form part of the EU ETS from 2013. It has 
been suggested that this would enable a more harmonised market, avoid distortions in that market and 
to improve the possibility of linking.  
4.2 The New Zealand ETS 
The New Zealand Emissions trading scheme (NZ ETS) was established by the Climate Change 
Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act 2008 (NZ) amending the Climate Change Response 
Act 2002 (NZ) (CCRA).   
The New Zealand scheme uniquely aims to incorporate all sectors, including agriculture, and all 
GHGs by 2015.
59
 Sectors are staged into the scheme from 2008 to 2015
60
. The inclusion of the 
agricultural sector in the NZ ETS, although unique, is essential for the effectiveness of the NZ ETS; 
Electricity in New Zealand is currently 67 percent renewable,
61
 and the majority of New Zealand 
GHG emissions are from the agricultural sector.
62
  
The New Zealand scheme accepts all forms of Kyoto units regardless of the origin of the unit, with 
the exception of units generated by nuclear projects.
63
 There are no restrictions on the number that can 
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enter the scheme, however foreign units allocated through the Kyoto targets, also known as AAUs, 
are unable to be used for compliance beyond 2012.
64
  
On 25
th
 November 2009 the New Zealand parliament passed the Climate Change Response 
(Moderated Emissions Trading) Amendment Bill 2009 (NZ).
65
 This Bill introduced a fixed price 
option of $25 to be included in the revised scheme for transport, energy and industrial sectors until 1 
January 2013. 
4.3 The Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) 
The most significant action by Australian legislators, intended to reduce the national GHG emissions 
inventory, was represented by the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme proposal.  
The CPRS proposal contained the details of the framework for an emissions trading scheme in 
Australia.  The bills containing the proposed legislation for this scheme were twice voted against in 
the Australian Senate in 2009.
 66 
The bills were reintroduced for a third time, after negotiations 
between opposing political parties, however, two months after the reintroduction it was announced 
that the CPRS would be delayed until the end of the first Kyoto commitment period.
67
  
Although this continues to be the policy of the Australian government subsequent to a leadership 
change, it would appear that the likelihood of the scheme receiving the support needed to be accepted 
into law is remote.
68
  
The scheme was intended to eventually regulate 75 percent of Australia‘s GHG emissions. 
Agricultural activities represented the most significant exclusion, which were intended to be left out 
of the scheme on an indefinite basis. The scheme contained a number of industry assistance measures, 
which were cautioned against by the Garnaut Review.
69
 Indeed the Garnaut review suggested that if 
these measures could not be resisted by legislators and policy makers, then a broad based carbon tax 
would be the preferable policy option.  
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The CPRS bill contained provision for a fixed price period where units would be capped at  A$10 per 
tonne of carbon dioxide from 2011 to 2012. This was to then transition to a period of price cap until 
the end of the financial year commencing on 1 July 2015.
70
  
The CPRS bill recognised different types of Kyoto units,
71
 with no restriction on the number of 
eligible international emissions units.
72
 This is in contrast to the EU ETS which has both quantity and 
quality limits on the Kyoto units. This provision would have had the potential to lead to the greatest 
loss of scheme credibility. The CPRS also allowed credits from emission reduction through domestic 
reforestation projects to be used to meet reduction obligations, which the EU ETS forbids.
73
  
Although the defeat of the scheme in the Senate was seen as a set back for climate change policy in 
Australia, the actual environmental effectiveness of the CPRS proposal was doubtful. Through an 
initially low ceiling price, unlimited numbers of acceptable Kyoto units, and recognition of 
‗temporary‘ emissions reductions, it is unlikely the CPRS would have had the desired environmental 
impact.  
5. CARBON TAXES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
5.1 Definition of a Carbon Tax 
The use of taxes to address environmental concerns is not a new concept. Indeed, taxes to control 
emissions were first introduced in the 1950s in European countries. The United States introduced 
taxation as a method of controlling Ozone Depleting Substances in the 1980s, and carbon taxes have 
been implemented since 1990.  Before considering carbon taxes of other domestic jurisdictions it is 
important to define what is meant by the term ‗carbon (or emissions) tax‘. 
The definition of a carbon tax varies based on existing legal and economic commentary and from 
observing the different designs of taxes implemented worldwide. A carbon tax may be narrowly 
defined to include only those taxes with a base directly related to the carbon content of a particular 
commodity or pollutant. This definition would exclude the legal measures adopted in the United 
Kingdom, for example, where the Climate Change Levy is designed without regard for the carbon 
content of the taxable product.   
The definition may extend to energy taxes or fossil fuel taxes that have been implemented for the 
specific purpose of reducing GHGs, which are emitted as a direct result of the production of the taxed 
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energy or the combustion of the taxed fossil fuel. The express purpose of these taxes is to mitigate 
climate change.
74
 This definition falls short of the broadest definition of a carbon tax, which includes 
all taxes on activities that cause GHG emissions.
75
 If defined broadly to include all taxes on activities 
that cause GHG emissions, an exhaustive analysis would require discussion of all fossil fuel based 
taxes, which may or may not lead to GHG emissions reductions. Therefore this paper is concerned 
strictly with taxes that have been implemented to mitigate climate change through GHG emissions 
reductions.  
5.2 Existing and Proposed Carbon Taxes 
The terms of reference of the Australian climate change committee include the consideration of 
coverage, linking, implementation and assistance. Far from being a new method for climate change 
mitigation, carbon taxes have been implemented and proposed since 1990. Although it will be 
unlikely that any carbon taxes implemented in domestic jurisdictions will be ‗linked‘ internationally, 
as is contemplated for an ETS, it may be that existing carbon taxes offer points of consideration for a 
carbon tax in Australia. This may include the consideration of Australian exports subject to double 
taxation, if no border adjustment is included in the Australian framework. Therefore the committee 
must give adequate attention to the practices of overseas domestic jurisdictions when contemplating 
any proposal for a carbon tax for Australia.
76
  
5.2.1 European Union 
The first carbon taxes in the world were initially introduced in Scandinavian countries. The majority 
of these countries are now part of the European Union, and are subject to Community law. The 
European Union provide legal frameworks for nation states to implement domestically, through 
directives and other sources of Community law. The Directives provide a result to be achieved, but 
the choice of how it is achieved is left to individual nation states.
77
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At the EU level there have been difficulties in trying to introduce environmental forms of taxation. 
Although environmental legislation is ordinarily submitted to a majority vote, any fiscal measure 
requires unanimity.
78
 The concept of a carbon tax was introduced in a 1992 Commission White paper, 
but following severe opposition, it was withdrawn. This was replaced by a far less ambitious proposal 
on energy products in 1997. The unanimous agreement eventuated through a modified version of the 
1997 proposal in 2003.
79
 The revised directive came into force on 1 January 2004. The directive 
provides a framework of rules to restructure and harmonize national tax systems within the context of 
the single market.
80
 The Directive sets minimum rates of excise taxation for energy and electricity 
production.  
The directive is based on two key ideas: 
1. The legal framework includes competing sources of energy, such as coal, lignite and natural 
gas, whenever they are used for heating purposes and as motor fuels. They are not taxed when used 
for chemical reduction in the steel industry for example. Electricity is also to be taxed;  and, 
 
2. The energy tax character of the levy is underlined by the fact that both the tax rates for natural 
gas and coal are set at an identical level per unit of energy created. 
81
 This means that the rate is in no 
way affected by the actual emissions.  
 
It must be noted that the destination principle of taxation, that is that taxation is imposed at the point 
of destination rather than at the production stage, is not supported within the EU framework by virtue 
of the ‗single market‘ principle. There have been no attempts to link different methods of taxation or 
provide rebates accordingly in the EU market. The single market principle requires minimal frontiers 
between member states.
82
 Border tax adjustments, imposed in accordance with the destination 
principle, pose barriers to free trade.   
The second important point to note is that the EU directive does not actually require the 
implementation of a carbon tax. Nations are able to simply impose taxation on energy and still be in 
compliance with this directive. A number of EU states, however, have imposed levies beyond the 
obligations of the directive, through implementation of carbon taxes.  
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Taxes imposed on GHG emissions, or for the purpose of mitigating climate change have been 
implemented in a number of countries across the European Union. These countries include: Ireland, 
The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. The 
following provides an overview of these carbon taxes, for the purpose of demonstrating the different 
means chosen by the different jurisdictions for achieving reductions in national GHG emissions.  
5.2.1.1 The United Kingdom (UK) 
Following extensive consultation with business, the Government of the United Kingdom introduced 
the Climate Change Levy (CCL) in the UK in April 2001.  The Climate Change Levy is effectively a 
tax on energy, rather than a broad based carbon tax. Although renewable energy is excluded from the 
tax, the base of the tax is not dependent on the prospective carbon emissions potential of the energy.
83
 
This is highlighted by the inclusion of nuclear power as a taxable energy type under the levy.
84
 
The overall objective of the Climate Change Levy is to reduce carbon emissions by taxing upstream 
energy users who cause those emissions.
85
 The CCL is intended to be a tax on energy and fossil fuels 
supplied to industries and commercial operations in a number of sectors of business.
86
 These sectors 
include industry, commerce, agriculture, public administration and other services.
87
 Any supplies used 
for domestic or non-business charity use are considered excluded supplies. 
88
  
There are a number of exemptions, and provisions for application of a reduced rate of tax under the 
CCL.
89
 Broadly, these categories include exclusions for domestic and charity use; exemption for 
supply used in transportation; exemption for fuels supplied not intended to be burnt in the UK; 
exemption for any electricity generated from renewable sources; exemption for self suppliers of 
electricity; exemption for electricity supplied from partly exempt power and heating combined 
stations; exemptions for supplies not used as fuel; and, exemption for supplies used to produce taxable 
commodities other than electricity.  
The Government gives an 80 percent discount in the levy rates for those energy intensive sectors of 
industry that have agreed to meet challenging targets for improving energy efficiency or reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions within a climate change agreement. These arrangements produce 
environmental benefits while allowing the industries to determine how best to achieve energy savings. 
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The Government has also suggested that participants in agreements will be able to achieve their 
targets either by trading emission allowances with other companies in an agreement or by 
participating in the wider UK emissions trading scheme.
90
  
The United Kingdom government has recently announced that the Climate Change Levy will be 
revised in the Finance Bill 2011.
91
 The purpose behind this revision is to provide more certainty and 
support to the United Kingdom carbon price. It is impossible to speculate on the results of this review, 
however, it may be that to provide more support to a price on emissions, the levy will be more closely 
linked with a commodity‘s  emissions content.  
5.2.1.2 Denmark  
Denmark was one of the first countries in the world to introduce a carbon tax in March 1992. This tax 
was implemented as a carbon dioxide tax on energy products.
92
 Even before a carbon tax was 
introduced Denmark had energy taxes attached to oil products, coal and electricity consumption. 
93
 
The carbon tax was initially introduced to energy products consumed only by households but was 
expanded to include energy products consumed by businesses less than one year later.
94
  
The carbon tax introduced in Denmark is effectively a surtax
95
 added to existing energy taxes, which 
dominate the Danish environmental tax regime. The reform was originally drafted with the objective 
of reducing rates on personal income. This intention has been maintained with each reform of the 
carbon tax since its introduction, and recycling of revenue through the income tax regime continues.  
There are a number of exemptions under the Danish CO2 tax regime to address competitiveness 
concerns. These exemptions are primarily for energy intensive industries.
96
 In 2000 businesses were 
offered reduced rates under the tax when agreements were entered with the Danish government 
promoting energy efficiency. 
97
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Currently the full rate of the tax is equal to approximately 12 EUR per tonne of CO2, with plans to 
increase this rate to 20 EUR per tonne, which will be offset by a decrease in the energy tax 
component. 
98
 
5.2.1.3 Finland 
Finland was the first country in Europe to introduce a carbon tax in 1990.
99
 The tax was levied on all 
energy products with the exclusion of transport fuels, which were already subject to existing energy 
taxes. When introduced, the tax was based purely on the carbon content of the energy product. 
Between 1994 and 1997 the tax changed to be based on a mixture of energy and carbon content of the 
product.  In 1997 the carbon tax was revised again to be based purely on the carbon content of the 
energy product.  
The Finnish Ministry describe their energy tax regime as a basic tax and a surtax.
100
 This is slightly 
misleading, given that a surtax is a tax that is levied as an additional percentage to an existing tax. In 
Finland, however, the ‗basic‘ tax is only collected on oil products, where the ‗surtax‘, which could 
also be described as the carbon tax, is levied on all fossil fuels and electricity. 
101
 Electricity is taxed at 
the consumption stage, with any fossil fuels used for power generation exempted to avoid double 
taxation.
102
  
There are some exemptions offered under the Finnish tax regime, although considerably less generous 
than some of their Nordic neighbours‘ exemptions. There are partial refunds for energy intensive 
industries; however the Finnish definition of ‗energy intensive‘ is significantly more difficult to 
satisfy than the definition of comparable jurisdictions.
103
  
The Finnish energy taxation regime did, at one point include a border tax adjustment on imported 
electricity. This adjustment was imposed at a different point of obligation to the domestic tax, using a 
different method for the liability calculation. This resulted in the flat rate for imported electricity 
being taxed at a higher rate than the lowest rate applicable to domestic electricity. This resulted in a 
challenge in the European Court of Justice, using Articles 9, 12 and 95 of the EC Treaty
104
 as 
justification for this challenge. It was held that the Finnish border tax adjustment did infringe Article 
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95 by imposing a higher level of taxation on imported than domestic products.
105
 The border tax 
adjustment was subsequently removed from the Finnish energy tax regime.  
5.2.1.4 Germany 
Environmental tax reforms with a goal to reduce GHG emissions and shift taxation from labour based 
to energy based, was introduced in Germany in 1999. The initial reforms required an increase of 
existing energy taxes coupled with the introduction of an electricity tax. The taxes are contained in the 
Statute of Energy Taxes, which has recently been amended to incorporate a tax on natural gas and 
coal. 
106
 
The tax is implemented on both electricity and fossil fuels. The total liability for the tax is determined 
according to volume or weight of most fossil fuels, with the exception of natural gas, which is 
measured by the kilowatt hour. Electricity is also taxed by kilowatt hour.
107
  
Many sectors within the German economy receive relief from the energy taxes. Manufacturing, 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries are all granted special provisions, offering up to 80 percent relief 
from the tax. These exemption provisions were initially introduced to prevent any competition 
distortion from the tax. They may also, however, lead to reduced environmental effectiveness of the 
tax. 
5.2.1.5 Ireland 
A carbon tax in Ireland was conceptualised in a 2009 Commission on Taxation Report.
 108   
The tax has 
since been incorporated into the 2010 Budget, with details of the legislation contained in the Finance 
Bill 2010.
109
 
The Irish price on carbon is imposed in three separate instruments of taxation. The first is a Natural 
Gas carbon tax
110
 which imposes a carbon tax on each megawatt hour of natural gas supplied. The rate 
is set per megawatt hour to equate to a charge of 15 Euros per tonne of carbon dioxide.
111
 
The second instrument is a Solid Fuel carbon tax.
112
 This imposes a carbon tax on each tonne of solid 
fuel supplied. Solid fuel is limited to coal or peat. Similar to the natural gas carbon tax, the rate on 
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each tonne of solid fuel is imposed to equate to a charge of 15 Euros per tonne of carbon dioxide 
emitted.  
The third means of pricing carbon emissions in Ireland is through the imposition of a surtax on 
mineral oil. This is not a separate carbon tax, unlike the solid fuel carbon tax and the natural gas 
carbon tax, rather it increases the percentage of the existing tax imposed on mineral oil. The increase 
in mineral oil tax applied in a two stage process, beginning in December 2009 with light oil, including 
petroleum, and some heavy oils; this was extended to include a greater number of heavy oils and 
liquefied petroleum gas in May 2010. Once again, the rate is set to equate to a charge of 15 Euros per 
tonne of carbon dioxide emitted.  
The tax period is two months for each of the taxable commodities, with a point of obligation imposed 
on the supplier of the product at the time supply is made to a consumer. 
113
  
A relief from the carbon charge is to apply where any of these fuels contain a form of biofuel, as long 
as the percentage of biofuel is greater than 10 percent.
114
 Furthermore, any fuel that is used for an 
installation covered by the EU ETS will be relieved from any tax obligations, thus potentially 
avoiding double taxation.
115
 The environmental impact of this provision may hinge on the market 
price of the EU ETS credits.  
5.2.1.6 France 
In 2009 the French Parliament proposed to introduce a carbon tax.  The objective of the tax was to 
establish a price signal reflecting the nuisance caused by emissions of carbon dioxide.
116
 The rate of 
tax applicable to each category of fuel, calculated on the basis of cost per tonne of carbon, was 
originally fixed at €17 per tonne of carbon dioxide emissions. This rate was intended to evolve to 
reflect fully, eventually, externalities associated with greenhouse gas emissions.  
The French carbon tax was incorporated into legislation in the Finance Bill 2010.
117
 Article 5 of the 
Bill outlined the details for the proposed carbon tax, explicitly excluding any emissions that were 
subject to the EU ETS.  Furthermore Article 7 of the Finance Bill 2009 provided for a 75 per cent 
refund of the carbon tax to farmers. This refund was to allow farmers to participate in international 
competition without facing undue consequences from the carbon tax.  
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The French carbon tax bill was challenged in the Conseil Constitutionnel,
118
 where the proposal was 
rejected on the basis that it violated the principle of equality of taxation.
119
 Following this the French 
parliament suggested that the carbon tax may be reintroduced, however, at the time of writing the 
carbon tax has been indefinitely delayed.  
5.2.1.7 Norway 
Taxes specifically on carbon dioxide emissions have been implemented in Norway since 1991. Before 
this, energy, electricity and sulphur taxes had been implemented as early as 1951. The legal 
framework for taxation in Norway underwent changes in 1998, with amendments made to incorporate 
all taxes levied on fossil fuels under the one act.
120
 The carbon tax is levied according to the emissions 
content of the fuel itself.
121
 Interestingly, there is no carbon tax on coal, coke
122
 or electricity, 
although, given that electricity is generated almost exclusively through hydropower, any carbon tax 
would be nominal.  
There are a number of exemptions in the Norwegian energy and carbon dioxide tax regime. Taxes on 
the continental shelf are significantly higher, with mineral oil taxed twice as much as mineral oil on 
the mainland, and natural gas being completely excluded from carbon taxation on the mainland.
123
 
Emissions intensive industries are also offered exemptions from the full tax rates.  
The overall impact of the fossil fuel excise tax regime in Norway is significant. With only 10 percent 
of the nation‘s GHG emissions subject to the requirements of the EU ETS, taxation is the primary 
means of addressing GHG pollution.  
5.2.1.8 Sweden 
The excise duties on fossil fuels in Sweden consist of four separate elements. These are energy, 
carbon dioxide, sulphur and nitrous oxide, with the carbon dioxide tax by far the most significant 
element, carrying the largest tax burden. The energy tax on fossil fuels was introduced in 1957.
124
 
This was subsequently lowered when the carbon tax was introduced in 1991. The intention of the 
carbon tax introduction was not to increase overall revenues, but to address environmental 
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degradation through a taxation mechanism. Both the carbon dioxide and the sulphur taxes are levied 
in accordance with the corresponding GHG content of the fossil fuel.  
There are a number of exemptions under the Swedish excise tax scheme, although the opportunities 
for reductions are less than other neighbouring Nordic countries.
125
 There are general tax exemptions 
for industries, with agriculture, forestry, fisheries and energy intensive industries receiving additional 
exemptions.  
The tax on carbon dioxide is the primary climate change mitigation measure in Sweden. Through the 
EU ETS Sweden has agreed to a four percent increase in their national emissions, giving little 
incentive to industrial installations to reduce their GHG emissions.  
5.2.1.9 The Netherlands 
Similar to many other European nations, taxation of energy products is not a recent reform in the 
Netherlands. Carbon dioxide became part of the energy tax base as early as 1990.
126
 Reform of energy 
and fuel taxes occurred during the 1990 decade, merging different tax measures. Since 2004 the taxes 
on energy products form part of the excise tax regime; coal is the notable exception to this, and is not 
the subject of taxation in the Netherlands.
127
  
Revenues raised by the energy excises are returned to the taxpayer through reduction of other tax 
mechanisms.  
Industries receive exemptions from the energy excise measures through industry agreements. 
Agreements negotiated between the government and energy intensive industries represent an 
important measure for climate change in the Netherlands.  
5.2.1.10 Italy 
Italy implemented a carbon tax in 1998.
128
 The carbon tax applies to all energy products, and is 
directly related to the carbon dioxide content of the product. The tax is imposed on energy industries, 
with transport fuels and coal used in electricity production most heavily taxed.
129
 
The funds from the carbon tax were initially used to finance domestic measures for climate change 
mitigation. Since 2002 the funds contribute to finance bilateral and multilateral activities in 
developing countries, with the purpose of widespread implementation of the UNFCCC.
130
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5.2.1.11 Slovenia 
Slovenia was the first country in Eastern and Central Europe to introduce a carbon tax.
131
 Energy 
taxation coupled with a carbon dioxide tax commenced in 1997. All energy products, with the 
exception of coal, attract a tax liability. The objective of the tax measures is to internalise the costs of 
the external costs of air pollution and to reduce energy consumption across all sectors of the 
economy.
132
 
In Slovenia, the tax rates are directly related to the carbon content of the products, equalling 
approximately €12.5 per tonne of CO2 equivalent. The revenue generated through the carbon and 
energy taxes in Slovenia are not recycled, as they are in many other European nations. Thus the 
carbon tax represents an additional burden on taxpayers.  Having said this, companies may be eligible 
for tax reductions up to 100 percent of their liability. In order to access these reductions companies 
must sign voluntary agreements for energy efficiency.
133
 
Emissions intensive industries required to participate in the EU ETS are completely exempt from the 
carbon tax in Slovenia.  
5.2.1.12 Estonia 
In Estonia all enterprises are obliged to have an air pollution permit when combustion equipment is 
either owned or operated. All permit holders are subject to the Environmental Charges Act 2006, 
which imposes an obligation to pay pollution charges for GHG emissions. Since 2009 the charge has 
been set at €2 per tonne of CO2 equivalent.134  
Industries subject to the charge are able to escape liability through environmental protection measures 
that reduce waste and pollution in the course of production.
135
  
5.2.2  Other Jurisdictions 
Beyond the EU carbon taxes are few and far between. Fuel taxes and other energy taxes are 
reasonably commonplace; although in general they are implemented without the specific purpose of 
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mitigating climate change. The following is a description of climate change taxes proposed and 
implemented beyond the European borders.  
5.2.2.1 Canada 
The Constitution in Canada imposes a number of powers exclusively on the provincial governments. 
One of these powers is the exclusive authority to make laws in relation to the development, 
conservation and management of non-renewable natural resources.
136
  
There are powers with respect to taxation, imposed through the Constitution, which pose questions of 
direct and indirect taxation.
137
 It is sufficient, at this stage, to note that it is the Provincial 
governments, rather than the National Government, that have imposed taxes for the purpose of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The result of this is that there is no tax or pricing measure for 
greenhouse gas emissions at a national level, and there is no uniformity in the provincial approaches.  
British Columbia (BC) 
In 2008 British Columbia introduced a broad based, revenue neutral carbon tax. This tax is imposed 
on fuels and combustibles, at various points of the supply chain.  
A purchaser is liable to pay the tax where fuel is purchased for their own purposes. This extends to 
use in industrial installations.
138
 The tax becomes payable on any combustible
139
 when a person within 
the jurisdiction burns the combustible for energy or heating purposes.  
The revenue collected through the tax is returned to taxpayers through tax cuts of personal and 
business income taxes. 
140
 
Quebec 
Quebec introduced a ‗duty‘ payable on coal, natural gas and oil in 2006.141 Producers and importers of 
these commodities are required to pay an annual duty into the Green Fund, which provides funding 
for measures to reduce GHG emissions in the province.
142
 The rate of the tax is directly linked to the 
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carbon dioxide content of the commodity.
143
 The point of obligation of the Quebec tax is upstream of 
the obligation contained in the BC carbon tax.  
Manitoba 
The Manitoba 2008 budget announced a coal emissions tax of $10 per tonne of carbon dioxide 
equivalent to commence in July 2011. A schedule to increase the tax to $30 per tonne is set to be 
released by this province.  
Legislation commits Manitoba to emissions reductions of six percent below 1990 levels.
144
 The coal 
tax aims to achieve this reduction, encouraging replacement of fossil fuels with biomass.
145
 
5.2.2.2 India 
India is responsible for the fifth largest inventory of GHG emissions in the world. Their yearly 
emissions currently exceed 1.2 billion tonnes.
146
 Similar to Australia, India relies on coal for energy 
generation.
147
 Coal accounts for 53 percent of India‘s energy consumption, and causes 65 percent of 
the country‘s carbon dioxide emissions.148  
On 26 February, 2010 the Indian Finance Minister announced the Clean Energy Cess, which is simply 
a tax on coal.  The rate of tax will equate to US$1 per tonne of coal mined in the country, and on coal 
imported from abroad.
149
 The funds collected through the Cess will be allocated for the purpose of 
financing and promoting clean energy initiatives. Research into clean energy will also be funded 
through the new tax collection.
150
  
The administrative simplicity of the tax is plainly evident, and possibly necessary given that India is a 
developing economy. Any more complicated measures may have been destined to fail through 
compliance issues. The regime for reporting of emissions contained in the National Greenhouse 
Energy Reporting Act in Australia, discussed in a subsequent section of this paper, does not exist in 
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India, and therefore the Clean Energy Cess provides a simple, possibly effective solution, to reduce 
India‘s significant GHG inventory.   
5.2.2.3 New Zealand 
In 2005 a document conceptualising a carbon tax for New Zealand was sent out for consultation by 
the New Zealand government.
151
 This document presented a framework for a carbon tax in New 
Zealand, which was to commence in 2007.
152
  
The levy was calculated according to an emission factor for the commodity being taxed. The emission 
factor was to be set by the regulator if the proposal for the New Zealand tax had been implemented.  
The products that were subject to the tax broadly fit into four distinct categories.  
 Solid fuels such as coal and lignite; 
 Liquid fuels such as diesel and petroleum; 
 Gaseous fuels such as natural gas and including all fugitive emissions; 
 Emissions from Industrial processes, such as coke, and emissions from aluminium 
production.
153
 
Products were to be taxed as early as possible in the supply chain. The reason for this, as provided by 
a 1997 policy paper,
154
 was to minimise the administrative burden, due to a low number of liable 
parties, and to increase the potential coverage of the tax. Therefore it was expected that coal suppliers 
would be liable for payment of the tax either at the first point of supply (unless it was intended for 
exportation), at the first point of use or, alternatively, at the point of importation.  
Rebates and exemptions from the carbon tax were to occur in three circumstances: 
 Negotiated Greenhouse Agreements; 
 Exportation of the taxable product; and, 
 Permanent sequestration or embedment.155 
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Negotiated Agreements were to offer relief from the tax for a firm‘s production activities. These 
agreements would not relieve a firm for their obligations to pay the carbon tax on fossil fuels. A 
Negotiated Agreement (NGA) was defined as an agreement between the government and a business 
that would be considered a competiveness-at-risk firm.
156
 These agreements were intended to lead to 
low emissions intensity per unit of production, in return for receiving a partial or full exemption from 
the carbon tax for production activities.  
Exports were exempted as part of the proposed border tax adjustment. The exemption for exportation 
was linked closely to the requirements for exemptions under the New Zealand GST legislation.  
Finally, sequestration, for forestry and biomass, was excluded as a possible means of exemption from 
the tax. Embedment in slow releasing products was allowed, and included the production of tyres, tar 
and plastic.  
In December 2005 the New Zealand government announced that the carbon tax proposal would not be 
implemented. The reason offered was that the tax would not achieve effective environmental 
outcomes, and therefore the cost of the scheme to both the government and to liable industries was 
unjustified.
157
 The announced cancellation of the carbon tax proposal occurred on the same day as a 
release of a climate change policy review,
158
 which recommended that the government undertake 
further consultation in response to this global environmental problem. The New Zealand government 
has since implemented an emissions trading scheme. 
6. HYBRID SCHEMES 
The meaning of a hybrid scheme for the climate change committee is undefined by the terms of 
reference or by any subsequent communications. It is likely that the meaning will be similar to the 
definition contained in the Garnaut review.  The Garnaut review states: 
Hybrid models address the tension between wanting certainty in both price and 
quantity. The basic feature of these models is the establishment of an emissions 
trading scheme (cap and trade) with an imposed upper limit on the price of permits.  
This involves initially issuing tradable permits up to a cap, but with a commitment by  
government to issue unlimited amounts of extra permits at a specified ceiling price.
159
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The New Zealand ETS and the Australian CPRS, by this definition would be considered hybrid 
schemes.  The environmental impacts of a hybrid scheme are largely unknown. It does, however, 
suspend the biggest strength of an ETS over a tax, which is the ability to cap emissions absolutely.  
7. A CARBON PRICE FOR AUSTRALIA? 
The review of other domestic jurisdictions brings to light a number of important lessons for Australian 
policy makers when considering a price on carbon and other GHG emissions. Beyond policy issues, 
including the liable entities and point of obligation, there exists a number of legal issues that must be 
considered by the Climate Change Committee. The experience in France highlights the importance of 
considering the Constitution and its requirements for any proposed new tax or economic measure. 
Furthermore, the amendments that have been required in many of the European countries with 
existing carbon tax laws in order to implement the EU ETS, effectively demonstrates a need to 
consider the existing legal and economic requirements of parties prior to the introduction of new 
economic instruments.  One other important lesson to be taken from the experience of other domestic 
jurisdictions is that any new economic measure does not need to represent an additional financial 
burden for liable entities. It is possible to implement a new measure, whilst at the same time reduce 
existing tax measures or obligations, thus alleviate any competitiveness concerns. This must be done 
while maintaining the environmental credibility of the scheme. This will require a review of existing 
taxation requirements for liable entities. 
Any proposed legal framework for a carbon price in Australia must take specific national 
circumstances into account. The following discussion highlights some of the existing national 
circumstances that would need to be considered by the Climate Change Committee, when a carbon 
price is contemplated.   
7.1 The Existing Legal Framework for Climate Change Mitigation 
Australia ratified the Kyoto Protocol in December 2007, after years of refusing to participate in this 
international agreement. Australia has been a party to the UNFCCC, however, since it came into force 
in March 1994. As a country to these conventions Australia is obliged to take action to mitigate 
climate change,
160
 and indeed, requires that targets are met for GHG emission inventory levels.
161
 The 
response of the Australian legislators, however, has been somewhat underwhelming.  
The most significant action by Australian legislators, intended to reduce the national GHG emissions 
inventory, was represented by the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme proposal. After this scheme 
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was twice voted against in the Senate, it has been indefinitely shelved as a policy measure. This leaves 
Australia without a clearly defined policy for GHG emissions reductions. One important piece of 
legislation, however, enacted in anticipation of an Australian ETS is The National Greenhouse and 
Energy Reporting Act 2007 
162
 (NGER Act).  
7.1.1 The NGER Act 
 
The NGER Act contains the reporting framework for Australia‘s greenhouse gas emissions inventory 
information.  The purpose of the introduction of this act was to support the emissions trading initiative 
of the CPRS. With the political future of the CPRS in doubt the NGER Act now predominately serves 
the purpose of assisting to meet international reporting obligations, and inform policy formulation. 
163
 
The NGER Act provides thresholds for reporting of GHG emissions, energy use and energy 
production, which were phased in from 1 July 2008.
164
 Any company which has an inventory, energy 
use or production above the thresholds contained in the act must be registered and provide the 
information required through the legislation. This act also provides for a number of administrative 
issues, such as reporting intervals,
165
 and required records. 
166
 
The NGER Act could potentially form the basis for a carbon price in Australia, given that the 
requirements for GHG emissions inventory reporting are contained in this legislation.  To make the 
requirements for reporting within any taxation or emissions trading regime significantly different 
from the requirements of this act could potentially cause administrative difficulties both for the liable 
entities and the regulator themselves.  
7.1.2 Renewable Energy Legislation 
The Australian Government has offered a renewable energy target as a primary policy for mitigating 
climate change in the interim period prior to the end of the first Kyoto commitment period.  The target 
for renewable energy generation is set at 20 per cent by 2020.
167
 A carbon price proposal will not be 
significantly influenced by the renewable energy target, although it is likely that the prospects of 
reaching this target would be improved if a carbon price was implemented. Indeed, the support of the 
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existing renewable energy and energy efficiency schemes is listed in the terms of reference for the 
Climate Change Committee, as one of the primary reasons for the introduction of a carbon price.
168
 
7.2 Other Relevant Australian Law 
7.2.1 The Australian Constitution 
Constitutional law regulates the three arms of government, the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary. The constitution provides the source and authority for power and circumscribes the limits of 
that power. The constitution provides rules and laws, which limit these arms of government, and 
includes the power to strike down any legislation which does not adhere to the laws of the 
constitution. 
169
 
Therefore when researching and developing any legislative framework for Australia, the laws and 
restrictions contained in the Australian Constitution must be considered.  
7.2.1.1 Definition of a Tax 
Any law enacted with respect to taxation must contain certain elements to be a valid law.
170
 In 
accordance with sections 51 and 99 of the Australian constitution, the High Court defines taxation to 
be the ―compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for public purposes, enforceable by law, 
and is not a payment for services rendered‖.171 
Therefore in line with this definition the requirements are: 
 Compulsory exaction, which is achieved simply by the words ―is imposed‖;172 
 Public Authority, commonly the Commissioner of Taxation; 
 Public Purposes, evidenced through the absence of earmarking and passing through to the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund; and, 
 That the tax is not a fee for services. 
Should a carbon tax be considered the best mechanism for an emissions price in Australia these 
provisions of the Constitution must be considered. It must also be noted that, in parts of the CPRS 
legislation, it was stated that the imposition of a permit price was taxation within the meaning of the 
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Constitution.
173
 Therefore, it is possible, that for any new legislative scheme for a carbon price in 
Australia to be implemented, the requirements of the Australian Constitution must be satisfied.  
Public Purposes  
The requirement that a tax is exacted for public purposes means that the funds of that tax cannot be 
earmarked for any particular purpose, and must be accumulated in the Consolidated Revenue Fund. 
However, payment into the Consolidated Revenue Fund does not mean that this condition is fulfilled.  
The High Court Case of Luton v Lessels (2002) 210 CLR 333
174
 was an example of monies being paid 
directly into the Consolidated Revenue Fund for child support purposes, with the same amount being 
redistributed directly to a particular child or their carer. The High Court held that this was not a tax as 
the scheme did not confer any benefit on the general community, didn‘t seek to exact money from the 
community and did not contemplate any net benefit to the Commonwealth.  
This decision of the High Court is relevant to the framework design for a carbon tax when considering 
the revenue recycling measures. In the Luton Case the lack of net increment to revenue for general 
government purposes lead to the decision that the charge in that instance was not a tax.
175
 This will be 
relevant when any revenue recycling measures, such as those of the European tax schemes, are 
contemplated for a carbon tax in Australia.  
Fee for Services 
A tax is distinguished from a fee for service, a licence or a charge on the basis that nothing is received 
in return for the payment of the tax.  
A decision of the High Court in Air Caledonie International v Commonwealth  (1988) 165 CLR 
462
176
 clarified the difference between these instruments. In this case it was determined that a fee 
would not be considered a tax if there was a ―discernable relationship‖ between the amount paid and 
the thing acquired by way of service, privilege or property.  
This has some relevance to the development of a carbon tax. For any payment to be considered a tax it 
must not confer a privilege, such as a right to emit carbon into the atmosphere.  
7.2.1.2 Excise Tax 
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Carbon taxes have been implemented and proposed throughout the world in many different forms. In 
most cases these jurisdictions have designated these taxes as excise duties.
177
 
The importance in defining the legal nature of carbon taxes lies in section 90 of the Australian 
Constitution, which states that:  
 On the imposition of uniform duties of customs the power of the 
Parliament to impose duties of customs and of excise, and to grant 
bounties on the production or export of goods shall become exclusive. 
 
Therefore only the Commonwealth has the power to impose duties of excise. Any state imposition 
will be unconstitutional. As such, any state based measure, such as those imposed in the provinces of 
Canada, will not be valid law in Australia.  
The actual purpose of this section of the Constitution is a matter of dispute between different 
constitutional scholars, and indeed judges applying the law.  It is the purpose, which has sometimes 
shaped the definition adopted in legal proceedings.
178
  
There exists both a narrow and broad definition of excise duties, as decided by the High Court of 
Australia. In the case of Ngo Ngo Ha v NSW (1997) 189 CLR 465 the High Court was split over the 
meaning. The majority of the court adopted the broad interpretation of excise tax, which is that an 
excise is a tax that is imposed at any point in the production, manufacture, distribution or sale of 
goods before they reach the hands of consumers. The minority, interpreted excise duties considerably 
more narrowly, to be only those taxes which are imposed on goods produced or manufactured locally.  
The broad view was similar to the definition expressed by Dixon J in Parton v Milk Board (1949) 80 
CLR 229. In this case Dixon J claimed that section 90 of the Constitution was intentionally drafted to 
give the Commonwealth financial control over the taxation of all commodities.
179
  
It is not the intention of this paper to examine the extensive case law defining excise taxes for the 
purposes of the Australian Constitution. It is sufficient to underscore the decision in the Ngo Ngo Ha 
case, and settle on the broad definition for present purposes. There is possibility that the definition 
will be disputed when the tax is imposed not on the commodity itself, but on the process or production 
associated with the manufacture of that commodity.   
7.2.2 The Australian Taxation Regime 
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Should the decision to implement either an emissions trading scheme or a carbon tax be coupled with 
revenue recycling, then a review of the whole tax system will be necessary to ensure that effective 
reductions are implemented, that will not impact the environmental objective of a carbon price, but at 
the same time provide assistance to those affected economically. The revenue recycling measures 
implemented in the EU, discussed in previous sections of this paper, may be considered when the best 
practice is determined for Australia.   As a recently imposed excise tax regime, the GST legislation, 
may provide important information if a carbon tax is used as the means to price GHG emissions in 
Australia.  
7.2.2.1 Goods and Services Tax (GST) Legislation
180
 
The carbon tax proposal of New Zealand had many references to the national GST legislation. The 
definitions included in the proposal, along with recommendations for alignment of reporting 
obligations would have resulted in entwinement of the two taxation instruments in New Zealand. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that for a tax to be administratively efficient consistency between 
instruments is essential.
181
 Therefore when considering a carbon price for Australia, an analysis of the 
existing GST laws may be required.  
8. CONCLUSION 
This article has argued for any legal framework for a carbon price to be specific to the national 
circumstances in Australia. The Climate Change Committee, established by the Prime Minister on 27
th
 
September 2010, must consider the frameworks implemented in other domestic jurisdictions before 
any decisions can be made on the desired instrument and design for an Australian carbon price. The 
consideration of other jurisdictions will inform this committee, not only on issues of linking schemes 
and economic matters beyond Australian borders, but it may also provide valuable information for 
implementation, coverage and assistance measures, that form the terms of reference for this 
committee.  
If an ETS is presented as the best measure for a carbon price for Australia then issues, such as 
acceptance of other schemes units, Kyoto units and rebates for imports already subject to emissions 
trading, must be contemplated. If a carbon tax is proposed then issues of double taxation, destination 
taxation and border tax adjustments are matters to be carefully measured by the Climate Change 
Committee. This will require that the committee is well informed of other jurisdictions‘ climate 
change mitigation strategies.  
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Finally, any Australian proposal must consider the existing legal framework, both nationally and 
internationally. The existing legal framework, both for climate change and taxation must be addressed 
when proposing a carbon price framework. Far from adding to the economic burden faced by 
individuals and businesses, a new carbon price framework may present a golden opportunity for 
taxation reform. The lessons of the European countries may prove valuable in this area. Indeed, a 
carbon tax price may present an opportunity to implement a much needed environmental reform, 
without an additional economic burden.  
